

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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25X1 The following report [] does not necessarily reflect the opinion of this agency. It was written [] after the 10 July 1953 announcement of the arrest of Lavrentiy P. Beriya. 25X1

1. Although the news about the removal of Beriya was surprising, it was not completely unexpected. There was bound to be a struggle among Stalin's possible successors, but no one could, nor yet can, foresee its outcome, even after the elimination of Beriya. It would be absolutely wrong to attribute to Malenkov liberal tendencies and say that Beriya favored the old Stalinist line. There most likely have not been any major differences in opinion between the two concerning Soviet global strategy, but still it was necessary to eliminate Beriya.
2. It might also be wrong to conclude that the recent riots in various parts of the Soviet bloc represent weakness on the part of the Soviet State. Soviet global strategy has found itself since the Korean war in a blind alley and has had to devise new methods, completely different from the old one that failed, i.e., the use of power. Judging from certain signs he could perceive in 1951 in Czechoslovakia, source believes that the plan was devised in that year and started to be implemented approximately after the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. There has been complete continuity in Soviet policy, despite the fact that the tactics have been reversed.
3. The first basic condition of the new plan was the necessity for the removal of Stalin so that new policies could be inaugurated. That is why Stalin had to die. It was then possible to start a completely new line, and the main effort had to be concentrated on the task of making the Western world believe that the change of heart is a real one and that Moscow means it. This effort has been started very cleverly. Instead of inviting the West to sit down at a conference and make concessions, Moscow tried to prove first by some deeds its willingness to end the cold war. The Kremlin has achieved more in the

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past few months by doing almost nothing than Stalin achieved with a great deployment of force in the past seven years. Today great differences on how to treat the USSR exist among the Western allies.

4. It is believed that the first open signs of Moscow's peaceful mood, which have so greatly affected especially Western Europe, were only a test for Moscow as to whether to adhere to the new policy or not. The test has been successful, and Soviet leaders have definitely decided to continue the new line. Moscow's long-range aims have not changed a bit but, in view of the circumstances, completely new tactics have been adopted. New concessions will certainly be made by Moscow, especially in Central Europe. The concessions will be so real that even the greatest doubters will be convinced. That is the aim of the Kremlin. The United States still maintains its negative attitude toward the new rulers in the Soviet Union, and these Soviet concessions will be aimed at splitting public opinion in America and at obtaining from the US Government the willingness for a settlement. In view of the concessions that will be offered, it will be almost impossible for the US Government to turn down the offers, especially since the alternative will be prolonged trouble all over the world and possibly war.
5. What the Soviets clearly want to achieve now is a period of peace for them, during which the pressure on the Soviet bloc will relax. They would like to bring the USSR again to a period like that from 1929 to 1936 for a new build-up of force. The method they are using at present is the most appropriate for that aim.
6. A possible explanation of why the Soviets will dare to make various real concessions and where these concessions will be made follows. 25X1
that the USSR has not believed that war was imminent and that the Soviet Union would not start a war at the present period. Now Moscow has arrived at the conclusion that it does not have to fear war started by the West and, for that reason, has changed its tactics in conformity with its new global political strategy. This means that Moscow can now make certain concessions that would look absolutely unjustifiable from a military standpoint, such as abandonment of certain areas. Such moves will tend to confuse further the picture of the real situation in the Soviet Union as it is now seen by the West from a military viewpoint.
7. There are already signs of such moves within the Soviet orbit. The advantage of such a change from purely military planning to political planning will be tremendous for the USSR. It will mean, among other things, that the Soviets will stop the armament race and divert more goods to the domestic market, thus placating the population, which, after 36 years of Communist indoctrination, is judging most everything from a purely material point of view.
8. The Soviet Union will, no doubt, concentrate now on Asia, where it has much more to gain than in Europe. That is why the concessions will be made in Central Europe and under no circumstances in China. The Soviet rulers may have arrived at the conclusion that it would be more advantageous to have in Central Europe states that are semi-independent, or semi-dependent, such as Czechoslovakia was from 1947 until 1948, that cooperate more or less willingly with the USSR, than to have slave nations that revolt.
9. For these reasons, it is believed that the Soviet Union will make concessions in Central Europe soon. These concessions will be the price paid by the USSR for a period of peace without pressures on its system. If the Soviets are successful with this plan, it will mean the gradual retirement of the US from European affairs. In the long range, however, it will also mean that the Soviet Union will be ready to take back these concessions at any time, whenever they have served their purpose.
10. The latest events in the Soviet Union appear to support this policy. Beriya was identified with the old tyrannical regime and therefore had to be eliminated. Malenkov got rid of a rival at the same time. Soon also Molotov will have to go because he is a symbol of ruthless international Soviet policy. These changes

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in leadership will make the new Soviet mood more credible in the West and more palatable to the Soviet population.

11. The removal of Beriya itself will probably not have a profound effect on any satellite leaders. However, as a result of the new policy which necessitated Beriya's removal, undoubtedly all the old-time satellite leaders will soon disappear. The present treatment of Rakosi does not mean a thing. He definitely is out, and it makes little difference whether he will be tried later or left for some time in token Party leadership.

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